(1) At 182c-d we get an interesting argument about flux, involving the insight that there is a problem in saying that X is in flux because constantly changing from F to G to H, etc.--the problem arises from the observation that F, G, and H themselves are in flux and thus cannot be identified / thought about / referred to any more than X can. (Am I getting this right?)
(2) At 183a-b we get the famous discussion of "thus and not thus"--famous in part because Aristotle echoes it repeatedly and prominently in Met. Γ 3-4. An interesting question is what kind of linguistic entity the "thus" there is supposed to be. If it is something like what we would call a "demonstrative," there are interesting questions about what objects and our mental states have to be like in order to apply demonstrative concepts to them. (I'm also reading this guy tonight.) But perhaps "thus" is rather just a placeholder for a noun?
(3) There's also a longer argument that perception could not be knowledge because it doesn't grasp the right kind of features. Truth depends on being, and knowing the truth depends on knowing being, and only the soul itself (not the soul through perception) can grasp being. When Socrates is introducing the idea that there are things (predicates? aspects?) that are only graspable by the soul, he draws from the special list of Forms from the Sophist and mentions being, one, same, and different (and possibly being two together, if that is a different thing [185b2]). But he eventually focuses on being for his argument that knowledge couldn't be perception. I'm curious whether and how well the argument would go through if he had substituted other items from that list for being, in the argument. (My gut reaction: it would still go through.) Also: is it possible to read that passage without thinking of M. Descartes and his wax?
Happy reading!
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