(1) 44c-d: Crito claims that the majority are able to inflict the greatest of evils--presumably death. Socrates dismisses this suggestion and then says that if the majority could inflict the greatest evils, they would also be capable of the greatest good. Does this relate to Pryio's discussion of the Apology from a few days ago (ref: 24d-ish), where Socrates seems to imply that one who knows who corrupts the young also knows who improves the young? The thought goes something like this: If someone knows what is good for X, she also knows what is bad for X, and if one knows how to inflict the greatest of evils on a person, one also knows how to inflict the greatest goods on that person.
Also, what are the greatest good and the greatest evil, for that matter?
(2) 47a: "one must not value all the opinions of men, but some and not others, nor the opinions of all men, but those of some and not of others". This is a weird formulation of the principle. On first reading, I thought he was saying that one should value some of the opinions of some of the men, which doesn't seem to be what the principle actually says.
IanH: Sorry to post again without addressing your points; I was already finished my post when I noticed yours!
ReplyDelete45c-e: Crito's claim that Socrates is doing something unjust, bad, and cowardly by remaining in Athens. This is what he accuses Socrates of:
- Not saving one's own life given the chance
- Allowing the plans of one's enemies to succeed
- Failing to educate the young (particularly one's own children)
- Child abandonment more generally
- "Choosing the easiest path" (virtue is hard!)
In general, Crito's accusations are about sins of omission, not commission. The concern seems to be that Socrates' general passivity in these matters is somehow vicious, or at least, inconsistent with virtue: Socrates is unjust, in part, because he is letting injustice be done to him (and to his children). At the extreme, one could accuse Socrates of failing to act, to be an agent, in any way at all. But does this Critonian picture of passive injustice - or injustice/cowardice as a lack of agency - fit with any of our other Socratic and Platonic conceptions of justice? If not, could this be why (as Cooper points out) Socrates does not directly address this point in his response?
IanH--Contrast, of course, Aristotle's commitment to examining the views of the many.
ReplyDeleteColfert--That's a useful way to put the point. Nozick claims that the Greeks were experts at thinking about the "moral push," not so good at the "moral pull." Not to say he's right, but this would be a good passage for such a thesis.
The formulation at 44d is odd.
ReplyDeleteAs IanH points out--his point (a)--what looks like recurrence of this weird principle, that knowing how to X involves knowing about the inverse of X also: knowing good, one also knows bad; knowing how to educate, one knows also how to corrupt; knowing how to heal requires that one knows also how to harm. And this just looks like a strange principle to have. (... Maybe?! ... surely is it strange for at least some examples of knowledge or technê.)
Socrates says that the many can do neither the greatest good nor the greatest harm--I take it that the fact that they cannot make a man wise or foolish is an identification of what is best (wisdom) and worst (foolishness). But then S says: "They cannot make a man either wise or foolish, but they inflict things haphazardly."
So, is it a requirement for being able to bring about the greatest good or harm that one be able to bring about a stable state in the sufferer? It sounds like S thinks that the many can bring about wisdom or foolishness, but not consistently (viz., they can do so haphazardly). (S gives an odd turn of phrase, that the many can inflict wisdom.)
Or, on the other hand, is S's point just that the many cannot inflict either wisdom or foolishness at all: is the "things" in S's claim meant to separate wisdom and foolishness off from everything else? --
The many can bring about anything that can be brought about haphazardly;
Wisdom and foolishness cannot be brought about haphazardly;
So: the many cannot bring about wisdom and foolishness.
**
On 47a: is there anyone about whom we would say that all of their opinions are valuable?