Hello all,
I shall try keep up with you and post when I have something to say.
I have one small question today. Socrates at c32b announces that he will now give a great proof of his claim that a man who fights for justice must lead a private, not a public life. Socrates begins by saying that "the things that I shall tell you are commonplace and smack of the lawcourts". Does Socrates here suggest that he has experience of the lawcourts? At 17d he tells us that this trial is his first appearance in a lawcourt. Socrates had never been on trial before, but would he qua Athenian citizen not have spent some time in the lawcourts? So how knowledgeable are we meant to think that Scorates was regarding the working of the lawcourts?
Hi everyone. I read yesterday as well but failed to comment.
ReplyDeleteSOC: Perhaps he means that it is his first time arguing in a law court at 17d, which might not disqualify him from having some sort of experience in law courts previously. (I looked at the Greek but did not feel qualified to make a judgment as to whether or not that was a plausible reading of the text.) At 32b-c, he discusses some sort of (perhaps quasi-?) legal event in which he was a member of the "presiding committee". I assume this is not exactly similar to the type of lawcourt S is in in the Apology, but it did seem to involve some sort of legal proceeding. I don't think the comment at 17d necessarily means he has never, for example, served on a jury.
(1) 29a-b: To fear death is to believe that death is a bad thing. Is this a general formula for fear, or is it particular to death? That is, if S fears A, where A is any sort of fearful object does S believe that A is a bad thing?
Welcome to SOC, and thanks to everyone for today's comments.
ReplyDeleteA few further things:
30d: "Wealth does not bring about excellence, but excellence makes wealth and everything else good for men, both individually and collectively."
I've heard all sorts of readings of this claim, including:
(1) Excellence is good, in part, because it reliably (if not infallibly) produces these other goods: it keeps us heathy and prevents us from squandering our money.
(2) Excellence makes other things good insofar as it is the source of their goodness: e.g., it makes it possible for us to use them well.
(3) Excellence (or at least, the pursuit of excellence) makes other things good because it makes life worth living: only once life is worth living can we recognize any value in anything else.
I myself disprefer (1), insofar as it seems to suggest that wealth (and health too) has intrinsic value, and this seems implausible, especially in the case of wealth. But if forced to choose between (2) and (3), I'm not entirely sure which I'd choose. (Also, what does the "... and collectively" add to this claim?)
34a: "there is Adeimantus, son of Ariston, brother of Plato here ..." This is slightly embarassing to report, but I'd forgotten that Plato explicitly writes himself into the dialogue here.
Good day of reading.
ReplyDelete(a) Are others subscribing to the posts to get email updates when someone posts a comment? This might be a good thing to do, because it would allow us to continue threads from earlier in the year. E.g., I followed up on Pryio's question on day 1 asking about how many times Socrates's "divine sign" is mentioned. (See 31c-d.)
(b) Also with respect to that whole discussion, compare the comment in the _Republic_ that if there were a city of good men, there would be competition ~not~ to rule, rather than to rule. (Somewhere in book I, right?)
(c) It's a bit strange that Socrates says that people hang out with him not because philosophy is exhilarating and good for you, but rather because it is satisfying to see supposedly wise people get taken down. (33c)
29b: S claims some knowledge.
ReplyDelete30b: S thinks that excellence makes "wealth and everything else good for men". Is this a necessary condition--that without excellence, wealth and everything else is not good for people? And does it follow from this that without excellence, wealth and other things are harmful?
30e: the gadfly analogy.
31d: the divine sign (cf. Euthyphro 3b.)
32b: SOC raised the question of S's comments on the law courts. It isn't clear to me how what he says is meant to smack of the law courts.
What S tells the jury is that he held one office in Athens, and that he refused to try ten men at once, as it was illegal; later, he did no cooperate with the Thirty tyrants.
Is this meant to show (1) that S has some experience of law and legal matters? Or (2) is it the sort of thing that a defendant would normally say--i.e., S is giving some evidence or trying to persuade the jury in a typical way. Or (3) is his diction somehow legal or rhetorical? Or perhaps (4) there is yet some other way that S's claims can be understood to be "commonplace and [to] smack of the lawcourts".
(Note the mention at 34c-e of some of the standard moves that defendants made in court.)
35d: none of S's accusers believe in the gods, allegedly!