15d: Socrates repeats something he brought up at the beginning of the dialogue: "If you had no clear knowledge of piety and impiety you would never have ventured to prosecute your old father for murder on behalf of a servant. For fear of the gods you would have been afraid to take the risk lest you should not be acting rightly ..."
Apart from the dramatic effects of these sorts of comments, they also seem to have a strange philosophical upshot. This is only an impression, but it seems to me that Socrates is here trying to apply what is usually an epistemic principle to the practical sphere. We are usually told that we should not believe something unless we are absolutely sure it is true. (And we should probably also have the occasional Socratic discussion in order to root out those rash, false beliefs that we inevitably acquire in daily life.) But in the passage above, we are now also being told that we should not act as if something is true unless we are absolutely sure it is true.
Obviously, the second, practical principle does not follow directly from the first, epistemic one. So what justifies it? It is not the same as the principle that we should act from knowledge of what is best (whenever we can), since this kind of principle doesn't automatically recommend against acting when you don't have knowledge. Perhaps we should refrain from assenting in cases in which assent might produce a false belief; but why should we refrain from acting unless we have knowledge?
Nice question, Colfert... there's of course a question here about domains. Perhaps Socrates is relying here on a principle strictly about knowledge of the good, or what is pious. The situation would be different in cases of knowledge that have nothing to do with the good. Oh, wait...
ReplyDelete(a) At 12c-e Socrates is using mereological language in explaining the relationship between piety and justice. It's very striking that he appears to move back and forth frictionlessly between what we would think of as the very different relations of part/whole and property/property-bearer. Even my putting the point that way must do some anachronistic violence to the intended sense of the passage, but I hope the idea is clear.
(b) Again at 12c, note that Plato is of course working with a very geometricized notion of _arithmos_. So when Socrates says that "fear covers a larger area than shame," and then discusses _arithmos_ and oddness, both terms in the analogy are spatial at least to a degree. NB, though, that Grube's translation might be misleading in using the word 'area.' If my very quick glance at the Greek was enough to get this right, Socrates does not use any primarily geometrical language, but rather makes the comparison with _pantachou_. In fact, if I'm reading this right, Grube's translation is quite inexact, and Socrates says something more like "fear is everywhere shame is."
(c) At 13a Socrates seems to pass immediately from 'hunters (uniquely) know how to care for dogs' to 'hunting is the care of dogs.' Obviously this is not a legitimate inference. What is going on here, dramatically or philosophically?
(d) Fun double meaning for 'circular _logos_' at 15b-c: Socrates is accusing Euthyphro of providing a circular account of piety, and also noting that the whole discussion has come around to where it started.
(e) At 15c-d, it is hard not to read Socrates' methodological conclusion--that they "must investigate again from the beginning"--as following directly from a general principle of argument or dialectic. Roughly: if you find a contradiction in your account, scrap everything and start over.
Nice discussion and questions Colfert. I don't have a response at the moment.
ReplyDeleteThanks for the comments, Nate.
I have one point today:
11c: Socrates and Euthyphro discuss propositions and conclusions "staying put" and "running away". This reminded me of Meno 98a.
11d: S suggests that he makes his own propositions move around, as well as those of other people. This might be a backhanded jab at E--that he keeps shifting his position--but S admits to doing that as well. (15b-c might influence the final interpretation of the Daedalus comparison.)
ReplyDelete15d: On Daedelus--the comparison with Proteus is interesting, since Proteus was a shapeshifter, I think; one of the heroes wrestles him and he transforms into all sorts of things in an effort to escape. (Also gets a mention somewhere in the 'Ion', I believe.)
15d: Some quick thoughts.
(a) Colfert, I agree that it is an off point that in the absence of knowledge, one should refrain from acting. Perhaps the 'Euthydemus' can cast some light on what is going on here--without knowledge, an agent will not know how to use the things that she has at hand. So it is best to do nothing.
(b) I think that the 'Gorgias' says something about knowledge and action, but I am unsure about the philosophical bits of that dialogue (as opposed to the political bits, I mean--the viciousness of the interlocutors, etc.).
(c) Is it odd that S tells E that he would have been ashamed (and so, been afraid) to do what men think is wrong (because that brings embarrassment), and also would have feared running the risk of doing wrong? And S does not deny that E has knowledge, only that he is willing to share it.
15e: It isn't clear where E is headed--into the courthouse, or away from it.
Ahoy, my fellow readers--a quick request: can whoever writes the post for the day please add whatever labels they see fit to their post? I have messed around a bit with the layout of the blog, and have added gadget that gives a list of all the labels in use. This might make it easier for interested parties to see what we have been reading and talking about, and easier for us to find old discussions quickly.
ReplyDeleteI hope that this is alright--cheers!
Thanks for the reminder, Pryio. I've edited yesterday's post, and will try to remember to do this in the future.
ReplyDeleteOne more thought: at 12e-13a, Socrates says: "You seem to me to put that very well, but I still need a bit of [_smikros_] information." Compare _Protagoras_ 329b-c, when Socrates responds to Protagoras's Great Speech by saying that the speech was so marvelous, and Socrates just needs one _smikros_ thing to be cleared up. (The _smikros_ issue there is the mereological relations between and among virtue, temperance, and piety.)
ReplyDelete