388a ff: S argues that a name is a sort of a tool. Does this mean that names can be excellent, i.e., have aretê? Cf. Resp. 352e-353a.
388e: what's the craft that S is talking about at this point? Is it the craft of using names, or the craft of setting the rules that govern the proper use of names? (Or something else?) One good reason to think that it is not the first option is that there are lots of people who can use names. (Perhaps it is the craft of using names correctly.) But one good reason to think that it is not the second option is that if only the rule-setter can set the rules that govern the proper use of names, then it looks like an instructor--presumably, an instructor who teaches a student what things are called, etc.--does not possess the craft of setting the rules.
Perhaps that outcome isn't as odd or objectionable as I first thought ...
I did the reading, but I don't have much to say tonight. Good questions, though, pryio.
ReplyDeleteNice post, Pryio. My own guess is that something closer to the second option is right; but I couldn't give a good defense of that.
ReplyDeleteI was most interested in the bit at 389b where Socrates uses the example of a broken shuttle to argue (if I'm reading this right) that the form of a shuttle 'to which one looks' while making a shuttle _is_ the shuttle.
(i) Should I read that 'form' as a full-blown Platonic Form?
(ii) How general is this principle? Is it correct to identify _everything_ with its form?