(a) Plato, having pointed out that X can participate both in the forms of F and opposite-F, develops a way to speak of opposition in the domain of the participants. X is opposite to F, or 'un-F,' if (i) X participates in opposite-F and (ii) X cannot participate in F. Surely (ii) needs some qualifications.
(b) 106e: "If the deathless is indestructible, then the soul, if it is deathless, would also be indesctructible?" It's tempting to read this as a straightforward inference, but NB that this inference-type is not generally valid for Plato, because entailments that hold between and among Forms don't necessarily generate analogous entailments for the participants of those forms. So Socrates here must be relying on the previous couple pages of metaphysics he's just developed.
(c) Love the line of thought at 107c-d. If you're wicked, don't count on death to bail you out of having a soul in bad condition!
(a) Plato, having pointed out that X can participate both in the forms of F and opposite-F, develops a way to speak of opposition in the domain of the participants. X is opposite to F, or 'un-F,' if (i) X participates in opposite-F and (ii) X cannot participate in F. Surely (ii) needs some qualifications.
ReplyDelete(b) 106e: "If the deathless is indestructible, then the soul, if it is deathless, would also be indesctructible?" It's tempting to read this as a straightforward inference, but NB that this inference-type is not generally valid for Plato, because entailments that hold between and among Forms don't necessarily generate analogous entailments for the participants of those forms. So Socrates here must be relying on the previous couple pages of metaphysics he's just developed.
(c) Love the line of thought at 107c-d. If you're wicked, don't count on death to bail you out of having a soul in bad condition!
Happy reading!
Starting to think I'm way off in (a). Hmm...
ReplyDeleteStill caught up and doing the reading.
ReplyDelete