First, my apologies to IanH for accidentally burying his very fine contribution yesterday under my longest-yet post.
Lots of action today : Socrates's intellectual biography, some theorizing of Forms, and discussion of the method of hypothesis. Rereading this part of the text, I am even more convinced by Wolfsdorf's view (which I think he shares with others) that 'hypothesis' is an inappropriate translation of
hupothesis. The former connotes, or possibly denotes, too much in the way of arbitrariness, conjecture, and haphazard (possibly 'intuitive' or 'speculative') formulation. Wolfsdorf, if I recall correctly, suggests that 'foundation' gets much closer to the meaning of the Greek. It certainly does not appear here that the hypothesis is something that is merely hypothesized, in the modern sense. I would defend this claim at greater length, but I've never managed to do so in fewer than 1000 words, and I'm exhausted.
Nate: Thanks for the remarks about hypothesis. This is very useful to keep in mind in upcoming dialogues as well.
ReplyDeleteA few further points:
96e-97a: Socrates's suggestions about the simplest, most basic (most obvious?) kind of knowledge are interesting (i.e., those pieces of knowledge that would be strangest and most outrageous for the study of natural science to overturn). Apparently, these topics include simple arithmetical operations, units, dyads, and combinations and divisions of these (Nate: are these *arithmetical* divisions, or a wider notion of separation?). Surely, however, at least according to Plato, there is another sense in which these very same topics really do deserve careful, detailed study in order to be properly understood ...
97d: A quote that is relevant to something a number of us have been puzzling over: "The same man [who knows what is best] must inevitably also know what is worse, for *that is part of the same knowledge*." Still, the question remains: Especially in the abstract, non-productive domain, why should we think these two things are part of the same body of knowledge?
One further thought: Since we could use all the help we can get in trying to figure out what a Platonic hypothesis is, I thought I'd make a suggestion.
ReplyDeleteA few days ago, Nate commented on the provisionality of much the discussion in the middle part of the dialogue. I now wonder whether all of those hedging comments might not (in part) be Plato's way of motivating and building up to the explicit statement of the method of hypothesis. In particular, perhaps the comments about not being absolutely certain but still pressing on with our "best and most irrefutable" theoretical option (85c), and the warnings against misology, might help us to understand how hypotheses are (1) in a sense provisional (they are not simply theses), and (2) not mere speculations or guesses, but really rigorously-thought-out options. Perhaps a hypothesis is the raft upon which we "sail through the dangers of life ... unless someone should make that journey safer and less risky upon a firmer vessel of divine doctrine"? If so, it's worth noting how theoretically complex a hypothesis can be. Presumably, the raft could be an entire theory!
Just a thought.
On "hypothesis":
ReplyDeleteStephen Menn, in "Plato and the Method of Analysis" (Phronesis 2002 v.47 no.3 pp 193-223) has a footnote (fn.33 on p. 217) referring to Carl Huffman's book "Philolaus of Croton" (Camb. 1993). Huffman pp. 78-92 collects a lot of earlier material, which Menn summarizes by saying that "the noun hypothesis is a relatively late development from the phrase 'hypotithesthai arkhĂȘn', to lay down a beginning for a discourse, where it is often assumed that the appropriate beginning must be something that the listeners will agree to." This explains among other things, according to Menn, why Plato can treat "hypothesis" and "arkhĂȘ" as equivalent at Phaedo 101d7 and 101e2.